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Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior

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  • Alex Possajennikov

Abstract

I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-002-0261-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (06)
Pages: 921-928

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:21:y:2003:i:4:p:921-928

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Related research

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Evolution; Aggregate-taking; Aggregative games.; JEL Classification Numbers: C72.;

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Cited by:
  1. Martin Jensen, 2010. "Aggregative games and best-reply potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 45-66, April.
  2. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Peter Duersch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 407-430, June.
  4. Peter Duersch & Joerg Oechssler & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2010. "Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games," Working Papers 104, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  5. Wolfgang Leininger, 2004. "Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games (new title: Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1266, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot oligopoly," Working Papers 537, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  7. Acemoglu, Daron & Jensen, Martin Kaae, 2013. "Aggregate comparative statics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 27-49.
  8. Birgitte Sloth & Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, 2006. "Economic Darwinism," CIE Discussion Papers 2006-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  9. Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004. "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1045-1057, November.
  10. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Fei Shi, 2012. "Imitation with asymmetric memory," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 193-215, January.
  11. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 553-564, August.

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