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Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting

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  • Emilio Barucci

    ()

  • Marco Tolotti

    ()

Abstract

We analyze binary choices in a random utility model assuming that the agent's preferences are affected by conformism (with respect to the behavior of the society) and coherence (with respect to his identity). We apply the analysis to sequential voting when voters like to win.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11403-011-0083-0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination.

Volume (Year): 7 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 79-98

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:7:y:2012:i:1:p:79-98

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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11403

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Related research

Keywords: Identity; Random utility models; Reputation; Social interaction; Voting systems; D72; D81; C62;

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References

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  1. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 1997. "A Formal Model of Theory Choice in Science," Research in Economics 97-04-031e, Santa Fe Institute.
  2. Stigler, George J & Becker, Gary S, 1977. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 76-90, March.
  3. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
  4. George A. Akerlof, 1997. "Social Distance and Social Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1005-1028, September.
  5. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October.
  6. Glaeser, Edward L & Sacerdote, Bruce & Scheinkman, Jose A, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 507-48, May.
  7. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2010. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1110 - 1150.
  8. Blume,L. & Durlauf,S., 2002. "Equilibrium concepts for social interaction models," Working papers 7, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  9. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2000. "Discrete choice with social interactions," Working papers 7, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  10. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
  11. Carayol, Nicolas & Dalle, Jean-Michel, 2007. "Sequential problem choice and the reward system in Open Science," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 167-191, June.
  12. Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June.
  13. Sugato Dasgupta & Kirk Randazzo & Reginald Sheehan & Kenneth Williams, 2008. "Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 315-335, December.
  14. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2008. "Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 212-17, May.
  15. Frank M. Bass, 1969. "A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(5), pages 215-227, January.
  16. Emilio Barucci & Marco Tolotti, 2009. "The dynamics of social interaction with agents’ heterogeneity," Working Papers 189, Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  17. Angela A. Hung & Charles R. Plott, 2001. "Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1508-1520, December.
  18. Paolo Dai Pra & Wolfgang J. Runggaldier & Elena Sartori & Marco Tolotti, 2007. "Large portfolio losses: A dynamic contagion model," Papers 0704.1348, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2009.
  19. George A. Akerlof, 2007. "The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 5-36, March.
  20. Cont, Rama & Löwe, Matthias, 2010. "Social distance, heterogeneity and social interactions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 572-590, July.
  21. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
  22. Callander, Steven, 2008. "Majority rule when voters like to win," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 393-420, November.
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