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Dominant market position and ordoliberalism

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  • Massimiliano Vatiero

Abstract

The ordoliberal distinction between performance competition and impediment competition may improve the understanding of the European distinction between a “dominant position” and an “abuse” of that position. Using a simple game-theory framework, I illustrate the dominant firm as a firm with, among other things, a dominant strategy in performance competition. If, due to the impediment condition, the dominant firm abandons its dominant strategy in the performance competition, then this firm is conducting abusively. In other words, the dominant firm should behave as-if it did not have economic power. It is the formulation of the ordoliberal as-if standard. As I show, such an ordoliberal standard leads to a wider concept of dominance that not only includes the economic domain but also considers the impact of private economic power on the political sphere . Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano Vatiero, 2015. "Dominant market position and ordoliberalism," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 62(4), pages 291-306, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:62:y:2015:i:4:p:291-306
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-015-0246-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Marty, 2021. "Competition and Regulatory Challenges in Digital Markets: How to Tackle the Issue of Self-Preferencing?," Working Papers halshs-03227392, HAL.
    2. Troels Krarup, 2019. "‘Ordo’ versus ‘Ordnung’: Catholic or Lutheran roots of German ordoliberal economic theory?," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 66(3), pages 305-323, September.
    3. Massimiliano Vatiero, 2023. "Extending Amartya Sen’s Paretian Liberal Paradox to a Firm’s Hierarchy," DEM Working Papers 2023/3, Department of Economics and Management.
    4. Gerasimos T. Soldatos, 2021. "Dominant bank oligopoly and economic stability," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 6416-6420, October.
    5. Manuel W?rsd?rfer, 2023. "Louis Brandeis - Founding Father of Modern-Day Antitrust?," HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2023(1), pages 5-43.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ordoliberalism; Market power; Dominant position; B13; B2; K21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • B2 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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