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The nature of land property rights and contract options in institutional changes: A case study of cooperation economy

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  • Baomin Cui

    ()

  • Hongtu Deng

    ()

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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11459-009-0014-3
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Frontiers of Economics in China.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 250-264

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:frecch:v:4:y:2009:i:2:p:250-264

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    Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11459

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    Related research

    Keywords: cooperative economy; nature of land property rights; contract choice; collective property rights and its attribute; principle of efficiency supreme; D23; 012; Q15; 合作经济; 土地产权的性质; 合约选择; 集体产权及其属性; 效率主义的至上原则;

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    1. Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
    2. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. Barsel, Y. & Suen, W., 1988. "Moral Hazard, Monitoring Cost, And The Choice Of Contracts," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 88-04, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    4. Coase, Ronald H., 1991. "The Institutional Structure of Production," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1991-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    5. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
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