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Cognitive ability and corruption: rule of law (still) matters

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  • Mohammad Reza Farzanegan

    (Philipps-Universität Marburg, Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies (CNMS), School of Business and Economics, Economics of the Middle East Research Group)

Abstract

This study shows that the “longer time horizon” argument proposed by Potrafke (Econ Lett, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.026 ) with regard to the negative effect of a higher national average cognitive ability on corruption holds only for countries with a relatively high quality of legal systems. Using a sample of 94 countries from around the world, our cross-country regression analyses show the moderating role of rule of law in the final effects of cognitive abilities on corruption. The results are robust after using different indicators of corruption, rule of law and cognitive skills.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, 2020. "Cognitive ability and corruption: rule of law (still) matters," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1723-1743, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:59:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00181-019-01687-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00181-019-01687-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Wensheng Xiao & Yu Tang & Bright Obuobi & Shaojian Qu & Minglan Yuan & Decai Tang, 2023. "The Influence of Rule of Law on Government’s Sustainable Economic Management: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(15), pages 1-23, July.
    2. Potrafke, Niklas, 2019. "Risk aversion, patience and intelligence: Evidence based on macro data," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 116-120.
    3. Laureti, Lucio & Costantiello, Alberto & Leogrande, Angelo, 2022. "The fight against corruption at global level. A metric approach," MPRA Paper 115837, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Intelligence; Cognitive; Rule of law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • E71 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on the Macro Economy
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy

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