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Wykorzystanie podatku od nieruchomości w lokalnej polityce podatkowej miast Unii Metropolii Polskich

Author

Listed:
  • Paweł Felis
  • Henryk Rosłaniec

Abstract

Z podatkami samorządowymi związane jest lokalne władztwo podatkowe, obejmujące m.in. prawo organów gmin do kształtowania wymiaru niektórych podatków, poprzez możliwość ustalania stawek podatkowych oraz wprowadzania ulg i zwolnień. Dlatego tak ważne jest rozpoznanie, a także zrozumienie motywów i zachowań władz samorządowych w odniesieniu do podatków lokalnych. W artykule uwaga skoncentrowana została na podatku od nieruchomości - najbardziej wydajnym ze wszystkich podatków lokalnych. Celem artykułu było ukazanie, w jaki sposób samorządy miejskie wykorzystują możliwości stwarzane przez obowiązujące obecnie w Polsce ramy prawne. Stąd w artykule starano się - dzięki metodom badania współzależności - ustalić związek między obniżeniem stawek oraz wielkością dochodów budżetowych, a także wyjaśnić statystyczne zróżnicowanie stawek w podatku od nieruchomości. Badanie oparte jest na dwóch źródłach: danych urzędowych pochodzących z oficjalnych sprawozdań budżetowych (Sprawozdanie Rb-27s) oraz protokołach z posiedzeń rad miejskich, na których były przyjmowane uchwały podatkowe. Zakres przestrzenny analiz to 12 miast w Polsce - członków Unii Metropolii Polskich. Wyniki badania empirycznego wskazują, że duże miasta miały zróżnicowaną politykę podatkową, a czynnikami po części tłumaczącymi te różnice są: wielkość i zamożność miasta. Ponadto uzyskane wyniki potwierdzają, że polityka podatkowa jest skorelowana z wysokością ich dochodów, ale ten związek nie jest stały w czasie.

Suggested Citation

  • Paweł Felis & Henryk Rosłaniec, 2017. "Wykorzystanie podatku od nieruchomości w lokalnej polityce podatkowej miast Unii Metropolii Polskich," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 2, pages 45-67.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2017:i:2:p:45-67
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    władztwo podatkowe władz lokalnych; polityka podatkowa miast; podatki lokalne; podatek od nieruchomości; obniżanie górnych stawek podatkowych;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies

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