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Global Finance and Capital Adequacy Regulation: Recreating Capitalist Social Relations

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  • Chris Rogers

Abstract

The paper argues that capital adequacy regulation has served to recreate the neoliberal form of capitalist social relations. It identifies two dimensions to this process. First, the paper argues that capital adequacy regulation in historical perspective can be understood to have incentivized, facilitated, and legitimated the kind of arbitrage that allow it to proceed. Second, it argues revisions to capital adequacy requirements serve to discipline mutual and cooperative forms of finance. JEL Classification: G28, P13, P16

Suggested Citation

  • Chris Rogers, 2018. "Global Finance and Capital Adequacy Regulation: Recreating Capitalist Social Relations," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 50(1), pages 66-81, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:50:y:2018:i:1:p:66-81
    DOI: 10.1177/0486613416666510
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jones, David, 2000. "Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 35-58, January.
    2. James Crotty, 2009. "Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the 'new financial architecture'," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 563-580, July.
    3. Mr. Martin Cihak & Mr. Heiko Hesse, 2007. "Cooperative Banks and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 2007/002, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Bruno Jossa, 2005. "Marx, Marxism and the cooperative movement," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 3-18, January.
    5. Blum, Jurg, 1999. "Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 755-771, May.
    6. Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    7. James Buckley & David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, 2012. "Internal Market: The Ongoing Struggle to ‘Protect’ Europe from Its Money Men," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50, pages 99-115, September.
    8. Bruno Jossa, 2012. "Cooperative Firms as a New Mode of Production," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 399-416, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel III; finance; Co-operative Bank; regulation; capital adequacy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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