IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/uta/papers/2019_03.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Intrinsic Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Korkut Alp Erturk

Abstract

The paper argues that financial deregulation incentivized financial firms to take excessive risks and over-expand because it turned social insurance against systemic risk into a common pool (or open) resource. The increased size and complexity of deregulated financial markets in turn raised the social cost of imposing discipline in financial markets to prohibitive levels. Because this undermined the credibility of the regulators threats of sanction, their deterrence strategy was from then on subgame imperfect. This suggests that moral hazard can be explained by the market expectation that regulators would act like a rational maximizer rather than by the things they irrationally did or not do.

Suggested Citation

  • Korkut Alp Erturk, 2019. "Intrinsic Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2019_03, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uta:papers:2019_03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economics.utah.edu/research/publications/2019-03.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, 2013. "An International Look at the Growth of Modern Finance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 73-96, Spring.
    2. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-212, May.
    3. Thomas Philippon, 2015. "Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1408-1438, April.
    4. Antoine Martin & Bruno M. Parigi, 2013. "Bank Capital Regulation and Structured Finance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 87-119, February.
    5. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2015. "Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10177-2.
    6. Hans Gersbach & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2012. "Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 73-109, December.
    7. Franklin Allen & Masahiko Aoki & Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Roger Gordon & Joseph E. S (ed.), 2012. "The Global Macro Economy and Finance," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-03425-0, December.
    8. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    9. Beck, Thorsten & Chen, Tao & Lin, Chen & Song, Frank M., 2016. "Financial innovation: The bright and the dark sides," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 28-51.
    10. G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), 2003. "Handbook of the Economics of Finance," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    11. Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2012. "Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 452-468.
    12. Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano, 2011. "The Consequences of Financial Innovation: A Counterfactual Research Agenda," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited, pages 523-575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, 2013. "Macroprudential Policy – A Literature Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 846-878, December.
    14. Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    15. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    16. Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, 2010. "When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 29-50, Winter.
    17. Kane, Edward J, 1990. "Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-764, July.
    18. Jones, David, 2000. "Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 35-58, January.
    19. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 2(Oct), pages 1-14.
    20. G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), 2003. "Handbook of the Economics of Finance," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 2.
    21. Freixas, Xavier & Laeven, Luc & Peydró, José-Luis, 2015. "Systemic Risk, Crises, and Macroprudential Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262028697, December.
    22. Martin Gilens, 2014. "Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9836.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tamer Khraisha & Keren Arthur, 2018. "Can we have a general theory of financial innovation processes? A conceptual review," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, December.
    2. Hasan Cömert & Gerald Epstein, 2016. "Finansal Yenilik Yazinindaki Son Gelismeler," STPS Working Papers 1604, STPS - Science and Technology Policy Studies Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Jan 2016.
    3. Heikki Marjosola, 2021. "The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 388-407, April.
    4. Buch, Claudia M. & Vogel, Edgar & Weigert, Benjamin, 2018. "Evaluating macroprudential policies," ESRB Working Paper Series 76, European Systemic Risk Board.
    5. Martynova, Natalya & Ratnovski, Lev & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank profitability, leverage constraints, and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    6. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2009. "Technological change, financial innovation, and diffusion in banking," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2009-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    7. Awrey, Dan, 2013. "Toward a supply-side theory of financial innovation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 401-419.
    8. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Matej Marinč, 2012. "Financial Innovations, Marketability and Stability in Banking," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Thakor, Anjan V., 2016. "The highs and the lows: A theory of credit risk assessment and pricing through the business cycle," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 1-29.
    10. Frederic Malherbe, 2020. "Optimal Capital Requirements over the Business and Financial Cycles," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 139-174, July.
    11. Ghazi Zouari & Imen Abdelmalek, 2020. "Financial Innovation, Risk Management, And Bank Performance," Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 9(1), pages 77-100.
    12. Aikman, David & Haldane, Andrew & Hinterschweiger, Marc & Kapadia, Sujit, 2018. "Rethinking financial stability," Bank of England working papers 712, Bank of England.
    13. Duchin, Ran & Sosyura, Denis, 2014. "Safer ratios, riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 1-28.
    14. Chen, Jiakai, 2022. "Market discipline and regulatory arbitrage: Evidence from ABCP liquidity guarantors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    15. Catullo, Ermanno & Giri, Federico & Gallegati, Mauro, 2021. "Macro- And Microprudential Policies: Sweet And Lowdown In A Credit Network Agent-Based Model," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(5), pages 1227-1246, July.
    16. Eliana Lauretta & Sajid M. Chaudhry & Daniel Santamaria, 2023. "Unveiling the black swan of the finance‐growth Nexus: Assumptions and preliminary evidence of virtuous and unvirtuous cycles," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 3749-3773, October.
    17. Turk Ariss, Rima, 2010. "On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 765-775, April.
    18. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    19. Mustansar, Talreja, 2023. "Financial innovation, technological improvement and bank’ profitability," OSF Preprints 8wy95, Center for Open Science.
    20. Kim, Teakdong & Koo, Bonwoo & Park, Minsoo, 2013. "Role of financial regulation and innovation in the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 662-672.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    systemic risk; moral hazard; financial deregulation; coordination failure; excessive risk taking and financial crisis JEL Classification: D72; C70; G20; G18;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uta:papers:2019_03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuutus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.