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The Determinants of State Government Debt Financing

Author

Listed:
  • Michael A. Ellis

    (Kent State University)

  • D. Eric Schansberg

    (Indiana University-New Albany)

Abstract

This article analyzes the determinants of state debt financing-including the composition of government spending and the desire to make intergenerational transfers, as well as a variety of economic, political, and institutional factors. The authors find that a greater proportion of younger voters is correlated with increased debt at the state level, but a greater proportion of elderly voters is correlated with decreased debt, probably because of the composition of state government spending. Moreover, the authors find that political variables are largely irrelevant to the accumulation of debt at the state level and that some types of institutional restraints are effective in limiting the size of state debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael A. Ellis & D. Eric Schansberg, 1999. "The Determinants of State Government Debt Financing," Public Finance Review, , vol. 27(6), pages 571-587, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:27:y:1999:i:6:p:571-587
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219902700601
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2018. "Resource Windfalls and Public Debt: The Role of Political Myopia," OxCarre Working Papers 205, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    4. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Reelection, growth and public debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    5. Bernoth, Kerstin & von Hagen, Jürgen & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2012. "Sovereign risk premiums in the European government bond market," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 975-995.
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    7. Robert A. Greer & Dwight V. Denison, 2016. "Determinants of Debt Concentration at the State Level," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 111-130, December.
    8. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2017. "Political Myopia, Public Debt," OxCarre Working Papers 200, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    9. Skip Krueger & Robert W. Walker, 2008. "Divided Government, Political Turnover, and State Bond Ratings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 259-286, May.
    10. Halebić Jasmin & Moćević Amina, 2020. "Analysis of Public Debt at Subnational Government Levels: Evidence from Cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina," South East European Journal of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 15(2), pages 109-123, December.
    11. Xenia Frei & Joachim Ragnitz & Felix Rösel, 2018. "Kosten kommunaler Leistungserstellung unter dem Einfluss von demografischem Wandel und Urbanisierung," ifo Dresden Studien, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 80.
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    13. Dwight V. Denison & Merl M. Hackbart & Michael J. Moody, 2009. "Intrastate Competition for Debt Resources," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(3), pages 269-288, May.

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