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Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not

Author

Listed:
  • Cristina Bicchieri

    (University of Pennsylvania, USA, cb36@sas.upenn.edu)

  • Erte Xiao

    (Carnegie Mellon University, USA)

  • Ryan Muldoon

    (University of Western Ontario, Canada)

Abstract

Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Bicchieri & Erte Xiao & Ryan Muldoon, 2011. "Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 10(2), pages 170-187, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:10:y:2011:i:2:p:170-187
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X10387260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Bicchieri,Cristina, 2006. "The Grammar of Society," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521574907, January.
    3. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
    4. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
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