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The game-theoretic model and experimental investigation of cyber wargaming

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  • Edward JM Colbert
  • Alexander Kott
  • Lawrence P Knachel

Abstract

We demonstrate that game-theoretic calculations serve as a useful tool for assisting cyber wargaming teams in identifying effective strategies. We note a significant similarity between formulating cyber wargaming strategies and the methodology known in the military practice as Course of Action (COA) generation. For scenarios in which the attacker must penetrate multiple layers in a defense-in-depth security configuration, an accounting of attacker and defender costs and penetration probabilities provides cost–utility payoff matrices and penetration probability matrices. These can be used as decision tools by both the defender and attacker. Inspection of the matrices allows players to deduce preferred strategies (COAs) based on game-theoretical equilibrium solutions. The matrices also help in analyzing the anticipated effects of potential human-based choices of wargame strategies and counter-strategies. We describe a mathematical game-theoretic formalism and offer detailed analysis of a cyber-physical table-top wargame executed at the US Army Research Laboratory. Our analysis shows how game-theoretical calculations can indeed provide a useful tool for effective decision-making during cyber wargames.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward JM Colbert & Alexander Kott & Lawrence P Knachel, 2020. "The game-theoretic model and experimental investigation of cyber wargaming," The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, , vol. 17(1), pages 21-38, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:joudef:v:17:y:2020:i:1:p:21-38
    DOI: 10.1177/1548512918795061
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. von Stengel, Bernhard & Zamir, Shmuel, 2010. "Leadership games with convex strategy sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 446-457, July.
    2. Kjell Hausken, 2002. "Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(1), pages 17-27, February.
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