Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a Counter Example in Large Poisson Games
AbstractApproval Voting is analyzed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: the Myersonâ€™s Large Poisson Games. We first establish the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of the pivot outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the Condorcet Winner need not be the Winner of the election in equilibrium under Approval Voting. Indeed, a â€˜paradoxicalâ€™ example is provided where a candidate ranked first by more than half of the voters is not the Winner of the election.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Theoretical Politics.
Volume (Year): 22 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael, 2008.
"One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, 01.
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & Laurent Bouton, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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