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The European Union and the political economy of enforcing international trade rules

Author

Listed:
  • Emile van Ommeren

    (Department of Political Science, 26660University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium)

  • Arlo Poletti

    (Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Trento, Italy)

  • Dirk De Bièvre

Abstract

The European Commission keeps track of foreign trade barriers through its Market Access Strategy. In this study, we examine some of the key political-economic conditions under which the European Union decides whether and how to address these trade issues. Drawing on an original dataset of (allegedly) illegal foreign trade barriers faced by European Union businesses, we show that industries dominated by a few large companies are more successful in gaining the support of the Commission to challenge these foreign trade barriers. Moreover, we find that the European Commission’s strategy depends on the economic power relationship with the trading partner: the European Union privileges negotiations when seeking to enforce international trade rules against economically weaker states, while it prefers to use litigation against stronger trading partners.

Suggested Citation

  • Emile van Ommeren & Arlo Poletti & Dirk De Bièvre, 2021. "The European Union and the political economy of enforcing international trade rules," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 377-400, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:22:y:2021:i:3:p:377-400
    DOI: 10.1177/14651165211001514
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Alexandra Molitorisová & Ciarán Burke, 2023. "Farm to fork strategy: Animal welfare, EU trade policy, and public participation," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(2), pages 881-910, June.

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