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Economic War and Democratic Peace

Author

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  • Cullen F. Goenner

    (Department of Economics University of North Dakota Grand Forks, North Dakota, USA, cullen.goenner@und.edu)

Abstract

Research has shown that democracies rarely, if ever, engage each other in war and are less likely to have militarized disputes than when interacting with authoritarian regimes. Economic sanctions are an alternative to militarized conflict viewed by the masses as more acceptable. The conflict-inhibiting effects of democratic norms and institutions are thus weakened with respect to the use of sanctions. This paper examines whether a country's decision to initiate sanctions is influenced by its regime type as well as that of the potential target. The results for the period 1950 to 1990 indicate that the more democratic a country is, the more likely it is to initiate sanctions. Democracies, however, are less likely to target other democratic regimes relative to nondemocratic regimes. With respect to sanctions use, pairs of democracies are not peaceful.

Suggested Citation

  • Cullen F. Goenner, 2007. "Economic War and Democratic Peace," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 171-182, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:24:y:2007:i:3:p:171-182
    DOI: 10.1080/07388940701468435
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644150.
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    Cited by:

    1. Amanda Murdie & Dursun Peksen, 2013. "The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-53, March.
    2. T. Clifton Morgan & Navin Bapat & Valentin Krustev, 2009. "The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(1), pages 92-110, February.

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