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The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions

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  • Amanda Murdie
  • Dursun Peksen

Abstract

What impact do human rights international non-governmental organizations (hereafter HROs) have on the initiation of economic sanctions? The extant literatures on sanctions and transnational non-state groups have largely overlooked the role, if any, the activities of these transnational non-state actors have on the use of economic coercion as a popular policy tool. In this study, we argue that HROs could affect sanction decisions through two distinct mechanisms: information production (“shaming and blaming”) and local empowerment (local presence). By bringing poor human rights performers into the international spotlight, we argue that this effect should hold even after accounting for human rights practices in the targeted countries. Using dyadic data on HROs and economic sanctions, we find robust support for our basic argument that HRO activities increase the likelihood of sanction events against repressive regimes. Additionally, much of the empirical support highlights the role of information production, as opposed to local empowerment, in leading to sanction onset. Overall, our findings indicate that HROs are powerful actors in influencing foreign policy decisions between states. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Amanda Murdie & Dursun Peksen, 2013. "The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-53, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:8:y:2013:i:1:p:33-53
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-012-9146-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Katharina Meissner, 2023. "How to sanction international wrongdoing? The design of EU restrictive measures," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 61-85, January.
    2. Simone Dietrich & Amanda Murdie, 2017. "Human rights shaming through INGOs and foreign aid delivery," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 95-120, March.
    3. Sara Kahn-Nisser, 2019. "When the targets are members and donors: Analyzing inter-governmental organizations’ human rights shaming," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 431-451, September.
    4. Amanda Murdie & Dursun Peksen, 2015. "Women’s rights INGO shaming and the government respect for women’s rights," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-22, March.
    5. Suparna Chaudhry & Sabrina Karim & Matt K Scroggs, 2021. "How leaders’ experiences and rebellion shape military recruitment during civil war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(5), pages 915-929, September.
    6. Attia, Hana & Grauvogel, Julia & von Soest, Christian, 2020. "The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    7. Kohno, Masaru & Montinola, Gabriella R. & Winters, Matthew S., 2023. "Foreign pressure and public opinion in target states," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).

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