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Sanctions as revelation regimes

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  • Daniel Verdier

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Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Verdier, 2009. "Sanctions as revelation regimes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 251-278, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:3:p:251-278
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0054-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644150.
    2. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    3. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521643320.
    4. Drezner, Daniel W., 2003. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 643-659, July.
    5. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    6. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, October.
    7. Kydd, Andrew, 2001. "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 801-828, October.
    8. Wagner, R. Harrison, 1988. "Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 461-483, July.
    9. A. Cooper Drury, 1998. "Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 35(4), pages 497-509, July.
    10. Nossal, Kim Richard, 1989. "International sanctions as international punishment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 301-322, April.
    11. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sanction; International regime; Screening mechanism; Reward; F51;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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