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Not Quite the Same

Author

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  • Martino Maggetti
  • Christian Ewert
  • Philipp Trein

Abstract

This article compares the role of regulatory intermediaries in the governance of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Australia and Switzerland. We argue that the creation, selection, and activation of specific intermediaries depend on the organizational capacity of the regulator and on the potential of the intermediary to be captured by the target. To limit the risk of capture of intermediaries where the regulated industries are powerful, regulators tend to keep intermediaries under their control. To do so, the regulator must be well-funded and well-staffed, or supported by its political principal. However, when the target has limited capture potential, regulators will rely more heavily on externalized intermediaries. These intermediaries typically consist of transnational organizations in charge of multiple regulatory issues in several jurisdictions, and can provide unique expertise in an efficient way. Four case studies of the Australian and Swiss regulatory regimes for therapeutic products support this argument.

Suggested Citation

  • Martino Maggetti & Christian Ewert & Philipp Trein, 2017. "Not Quite the Same," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 670(1), pages 152-169, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:152-169
    DOI: 10.1177/0002716217691240
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Jean-Pierre Galland, 2017. "Big Third-Party Certifiers and the Construction of Transnational Regulation," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 670(1), pages 263-279, March.
    6. Scherer, F.M., 2000. "The pharmaceutical industry," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 25, pages 1297-1336, Elsevier.
    7. Michael M. Ting, 2011. "Organizational Capacity," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 245-271.
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