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National Forces in State Legislative Elections

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  • Steven Rogers

Abstract

The race for the White House is at the top of the ticket, but voters will also choose more than 5,000 state legislators in November 2016. While voters elect and hold the president responsible for one job and state legislators for another, the outcomes of their elections are remarkably related. In analyses of elite and voter behavior in state legislative elections, I show that legislators affiliated with the president’s party—especially during unpopular presidencies—are the most likely to be challenged, and compared with individual assessments of the state legislature, changes in presidential approval have at least three times the impact on voters’ decision-making in state legislative elections. Thus, while state legislatures wield considerable policymaking power, legislators’ electoral fates appear to be largely out of their control.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Rogers, 2016. "National Forces in State Legislative Elections," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 667(1), pages 207-225, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:667:y:2016:i:1:p:207-225
    DOI: 10.1177/0002716216662454
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Burke, 2021. "Nationalization and Its Consequences for State Legislatures," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(1), pages 269-280, January.
    2. Jacob M. Grumbach & Jamila Michener, 2022. "American Federalism, Political Inequality, and Democratic Erosion," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 699(1), pages 143-155, January.

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