Auditing and Property Rights
AbstractThird-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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Other versions of this item:
- Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Legros, 2004. "Auditing and property rights," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles 2013/7028, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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