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Auditing and Property Rights

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Author Info

  • Elisabetta Iossa

    ()
    (Brunel University and University of Bristol)

  • Patrick Legros

    ()
    (ECARES, Universit� Libre de Bruxelles, and CEPR)

Abstract

Third-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 356-372

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:2:p:356-372

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Cited by:
  1. Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2007. "Integration and Separation with Costly Demand Information," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK 07/167, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  2. Florian Schuett, 2009. "Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute ECO2009/28, European University Institute.
  3. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
  4. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Public-private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0075, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  5. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
  7. Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2008. "Vertical Integration and Costly Demand Information in Regulated Network Industries," CEDI Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University 08-03, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  8. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2005. "Stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2005089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Fabrizio Balassone (editor), 2012. "The efficiency of infrastructure spending," Workshop and Conferences, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area 10, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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