Integration and Separation with Costly Demand Information
AbstractWe consider an industry characterized by a regulated natural monopoly in the upstream market and Cournot competition with demand uncertainty in the unregulated downstream market. The realization of demand cannot be observed by the regulator, whilst it can be privately observed at some cost by the upstream monopolist. Information acquisition is also unobservable. We study whether it is better to allow the monopolist to operate in the downstream market (integration) or instead to exclude it (separation). We show that asymmetric information on demand favours separation but unobservability of information acquisition favours integration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 07/167.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Information acquisition; liberalization and separation;
Other versions of this item:
- Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2007. "Integration and Separation with Costly Demand Information," CSEF Working Papers 170, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-03-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2007-03-10 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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