International R&D Tournaments and Industrial Policy
AbstractThis paper provides a unified approach to study the influence of uncertainty and spillovers on the direction of R&D policy when firms engage in international R&D competition. When the reward to the winner is exogenously given, it is shown that whether a government will tax or subsidize its firm is sensitive to the type of uncertainty that characterizes the R&D process. When the reward to the winner is endogenously determined by R&D spending, the direction of optimal policy is not only sensitive to the type of uncertainty, but also sensitive to the degree of spillovers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University in its journal Journal of Economic Integration.
Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
International R&D tournaments; Industrial policy; Uncertainty; Spillovers;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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