Javier A. Gutierrez (Secretaría de Hacienda de Bogotá) Carolina Guzmán (Secretaría de Hacienda de Bogotá) Ulpiano J. Jiménez (Secretaría de Hacienda de Bogotá)
Abstract
This paper summarizes theoretical models and empirical evidence concerning political economy of public finances. It emphasizes political and institutional issues that influence different levels of public debt and fiscal deficits in countries and subnational entities with similar economic performance, and describes fiscal contract relationships between governors and voters using principal-agent theory. It then applies methods of experimental economics and game theory, to evaluate how these relationships contribute in debt accumulation and fiscal unbalances, in a laboratory experiment in which participants act as agents (governors) and then as principals (voters).
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Volume (Year): 2 (2000) Issue (Month): 3 (July-december) Pages: 104-148 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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