Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

El concepto de incentivo en administración. Una revisión de la literatura

Contents:

Author Info

  • Yuri Gorbaneff

    ()
    (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

  • Sergio Torres

    ()
    (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

  • José Fernando Cardona

    ()
    (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The paper reviews and discusses the literature on the concept of incentive in management; the visions of ancient Greek philosophers, classical economists, scientific management, agency theory, contracts, property theory and transaction costs theory. The discussion shows that the transaction costs theory, with its central idea of forms of governance, constitutes a comprehensive view of incentives that explains what are the inexplicable paradoxes for other theoretical perspectives. The paper analyzes the relations between incentives and helps to build up a theoretical and useful formal model of incentives.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/ygorbaneff21.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 21 (July-December)
    Pages: 73-91

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:11:y:2009:i:21:p:73-91

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Cra. 1 No. 12-68 Casa de las Mandolinas
    Phone: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1307
    Fax: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1304
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.economiainstitucional.com
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: incentive; governance form; transaction costs;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "The Firm as a Multicontact Organization," Papers 95.390, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    4. William G. Ouchi, 1979. "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 833-848, September.
    5. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2001. "Bringing the Market inside the Firm?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 212-218, May.
    6. Stephen Dunn, 2000. "Fundamental Uncertainty and the Firm in the Long Run," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 419-433.
    7. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    9. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    10. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:11:y:2009:i:21:p:73-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paola Rodríguez).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.