Come difendere la globalizzazione e salvaguardare i sistemi bancari dal contagio
AbstractThe work summarises the main literature on the impact of globalisation and of the crisis on banking systems.The main conclusion is that a more compelling approach to financial regulation appears as necessary, though the complete homogenisation of financial systems is not a goal to be sought. The current approaches in the Anglo-Saxon countries, based on the segmentation of banking activities seems a right choice, due to both the political difficulties in enacting a stricter regulation of finance and the practical difficulty of regulating a sector pervaded by financial innovation. However, both the Volcker rule and the British approach of ring-fencing, suffer from two limitations: the risk of transferring even more risk to the shadow banking system, and the difficulty in practice to distinguish between legitimate hedging activities and forbidden speculative activities.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Economia civile in its journal Moneta e Credito.
Volume (Year): 65 (2012)
Issue (Month): 257 ()
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Web page: http://www.economiacivile.it
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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