Asymmetric information in managing agricultural production risk
AbstractThe aim of the paper is to apply a theory of asymmetric information to managing production risk in agriculture. The second part of the paper is devoted to the tools for reducing the information asymmetry - parametric products (weather derivatives, index insurance). The results are based on empirical analyses published in scientific journals. The findings were consulted with specialists on agricultural insurance in the Czech Republic. The results indicate the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection in farmers' behaviour. The article is a theoretical basis for definition of weather derivatives in agriculture.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Ekonomika a Management.
Volume (Year): 2010 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Postal: Redakce Ekonomika a management, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
- Vedenov, Dmitry V. & Barnett, Barry J., 2004. "Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance Instruments," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(03), December.
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- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- Michael J. Roberts & Nigel Key & Erik O'Donoghue, 2006. "Estimating the Extent of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance Using Administrative Data ," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 381-390.
- Richard E. Just & Linda Calvin & John Quiggin, 1999. "Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(4), pages 834-849.
- Goodwin, Barry K., 2000. "Instability And Risk In U.S. Agriculture," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 18(1), March.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
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