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You Have My Word: Reciprocity Expectation Modulates Feedback-Related Negativity in the Trust Game

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  • Qingguo Ma
  • Liang Meng
  • Qiang Shen

Abstract

Promise is one of the most powerful tools producing trust and facilitating cooperation, and sticking to the promise is deemed as a key social norm in social interactions. The present study explored the extent to which promise would influence investors’ decision-making in the trust game where promise had no predictive value regarding trustees’ reciprocation. In addition, we examined the neural underpinnings of the investors’ outcome processing related to the trustees’ promise keeping and promise breaking. Consistent with our hypothesis, behavioral results indicated that promise could effectively increase the investment frequency of investors. Electrophysiological results showed that, promise induced larger differentiated-FRN responses to the reward and non-reward discrepancy. Taken together, these results suggested that promise would promote cooperative behavior, while breach of promise would be regarded as a violation of the social norm, corroborating the vital role of non-enforceable commitment in social decision making.

Suggested Citation

  • Qingguo Ma & Liang Meng & Qiang Shen, 2015. "You Have My Word: Reciprocity Expectation Modulates Feedback-Related Negativity in the Trust Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(2), pages 1-10, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0119129
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0119129
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    1. Schniter, Eric & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Sznycer, Daniel, 2013. "Building and rebuilding trust with promises and apologies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 242-256.
    2. Johnson, Noel D. & Mislin, Alexandra A., 2011. "Trust games: A meta-analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 865-889.
    3. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
    4. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giorgia Ponsi & Maria Serena Panasiti & Salvatore Maria Aglioti & Marco Tullio Liuzza, 2017. "Right-wing authoritarianism and stereotype-driven expectations interact in shaping intergroup trust in one-shot vs multiple-round social interactions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(12), pages 1-23, December.
    2. Julian Conrads & Tommaso Reggiani, 2017. "The effect of communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(3), pages 595-611, October.

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