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The behavioral model and game theory

Author

Listed:
  • Gholamreza Askari

    (Semnan University)

  • Madjid Eshaghi Gordji

    (Semnan University)

  • Choonkil Park

    (Hanyang University)

Abstract

The rational choice theory is based on this idea that people rationally pursue goals for increasing their personal interests. Here, we present a new concept of rational choice as a hyper-rational choice in which the actor thinks about profit or loss of other actors in addition to his personal profit or loss and then will choose an action that is desirable to him. We implement the hyper-rational choice to generalize and expand the game theory. Results of this study will help to model the behavior of people considering environmental conditions, the type of behavioral interaction, valuation system of itself and others, and system of beliefs and internal values of societies. Hyper-rationality helps us understand how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gholamreza Askari & Madjid Eshaghi Gordji & Choonkil Park, 2019. "The behavioral model and game theory," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 5(1), pages 1-8, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palcom:v:5:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-019-0265-2
    DOI: 10.1057/s41599-019-0265-2
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