Export Quota Allocations, Export Earnings, and Market Diversification
AbstractNon-tariff barriers (NTBs) present a growing threat to a liberal world-trading system and slow the reallocation of production of mature industries from developed to developing countries. Among NTBs, voluntary export restraints (VERs) are proliferating and constitute a major element of the"new protectionism". It has been repeatedly observed that export markets which are not currently part of the VER agreement often follow suit and enter into a VER agreement. Exporting countries may then wish to prepare themselves for this eventuality by actively promoting export diversification towards non-restricted countries as a precautionary measure against future restrictions. Section II of this paper briefly describes how export diversification is typically achieved. In Section III, a simple model is set up that analyzes the implications of the two tier quota allocation rule. Section IV briefly examines alternative instruments and motivations for achieving export diversification. Implications are also drawn for policy actions by nonrestricted countries and the suggestion made that the recent increase in anti-dumping cases may be linked to this two-tier quota allocation practice.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Bank Group in its journal World Bank Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 2 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Bark, Taeho & de Melo, Jaime, 1988. "Export quota allocations, export earnings and market diversifications," Policy Research Working Paper Series 89, The World Bank.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980.
"Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-87, December.
- J. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, 1979. "Revenue-Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Working papers 243, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Aw, Bee Yan & Roberts, Mark J., 1986. "Measuring quality change in quota-constrained import markets: The Case of U.S. Footwear," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 45-60, August.
- McCulloch, Rachel & Johnson, Harry G, 1973. "A Note on Proportionally Distributed Quotas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(4), pages 726-32, September.
- Taeho Bark & Jaime Melo, 1987. "Export mix adjustment to the imposition of VERs: Alternative license allocation schemes," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 123(4), pages 668-678, December.
- Falvey, Rodney E, 1979. "The Composition of Trade within Import-restricted Product Categories," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 1105-14, October.
- Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
- De Melo, Jaime & Winters, L. Alan, 1989. "Price and quality effects of VERs - revisited : a case study of Korean footwear exports," Policy Research Working Paper Series 216, The World Bank.
- Riccardo Faini & Jaime Melo & Wendy Takacs, 1995.
"A Primer on the MFA Maze,"
The World Economy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 113-135, 01.
- Faini, Riccardo & de Melo, Jaime & Takacs, Wendy, 1993. "A primer on the MFA maze," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1088, The World Bank.
- Faini, R. & Melo, J. de & Takacs, W., 1992. "A Primer on the MFA Maze," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 92.15, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
- de Melo, Jaime & Faini, Riccardo, 1992. "A Primer on the MFA Maze," CEPR Discussion Papers 716, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- de Melo, Jaime & Winters, L Alan, 1990.
"Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource Allocation in Exporting Countries,"
World Bank Economic Review,
World Bank Group, vol. 4(2), pages 209-33, May.
- de Melo, Jaime & Winters, L. Alan, 1990. "Voluntary export restraints and resource allocation in exporting countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 352, The World Bank.
- Takacs, Wendy E., 1991. "Domestic purchase requirements for import license allocations in Mali," Policy Research Working Paper Series 569, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.