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Allocation of Goods by Lottery

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Author Info

  • Boyce, John R

Abstract

Many authors have argued that lotteries are used to allocate resources because of the fairness of the mechanism. However, a number of historical examples suggest otherwise. Participation fees are almost always charged and they are often discriminatory. In addition, goods (or bads) allocated by lotteries are usually not transferable. Both lottery participation fees and restrictions on transferability reduce rent-seeking from speculators. Each feature increases the rents to the primary user groups relative to the rents attainable from alternative mechanisms such as auctions, queues, or merit allocations. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 32 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 457-76

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:3:p:457-76

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Cited by:
  1. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Politics of Randomness," CESifo Working Paper Series 803, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Adrienne Ohler & Hayley Chouinard & Jonathan Yoder, 2014. "Interest group incentives for post-lottery trade restrictions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 281-304, June.
  3. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  4. Scrogin, David & Berrens, Robert P., 2001. "Rationed Access And Welfare: Case Of Public Resource Lotteries," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20472, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  5. Ohler, Adrienne & Chouinard, Hayley H. & Yoder, Jonathan K., 2007. "Welfare Trade-offs between Transferable and Non-Transferable Lotteries," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon 7363, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
  6. Taylor, Grant A. & Tsui, Kevin K. K. & Zhu, Lijing, 2003. "Lottery or waiting-line auction?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1313-1334, May.
  7. Scrogin, David, 2005. "Lottery-rationed public access under alternative tariff arrangements: changes in quality, quantity, and expected utility," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 189-211, July.
  8. Chu, Singfat, 2012. "Allocation flexibility and price efficiency within Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1541-1550.
  9. Scrogin, David & Berrens, Robert P. & Bohara, Alok K., 2000. "Policy Changes And The Demand For Lottery-Rationed Big Game Hunting Licenses," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 25(02), December.
  10. Evans, Mary F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Flores, Nicholas E., 2009. "Hybrid allocation mechanisms for publicly provided goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 311-325, February.

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