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A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

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Author Info
Thomas J. Miceli
Kathleen Segerson

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Abstract

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are a significant threat, resulting in costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahm005
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal American Law and Economics Review.

Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 160-174
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:9:y:2007:i:1:p:160-174

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Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Pitchford, Rohan, 2001. "Chasing Patents," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 411, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Cohen, Lloyd, 1991. "Holdouts and Free Riders," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 351-62, June.
  3. Blume, Lawrence & Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Shapiro, Perry, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson & C. F. Sirmans, 2007. "Tax Motivated Takings," Working papers 2007-43, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kurtis Swope, Pamela Schmitt, John Cadigan and Robert Shupp, 2008. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Departmental Working Papers 21, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Steven Shavell, 2007. "Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperpect Information About Owners' Valuation," NBER Working Papers 13564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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