The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Housing Economics.
Volume (Year): 16 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622881
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- Cohen, Lloyd, 1991. "Holdouts and Free Riders," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 351-62, June.
- Colwell, Peter F & Munneke, Henry J, 1999. "Land Prices and Land Assembly in the CBD," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 163-80, March.
- Thomas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2006.
"A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings,"
2006-22, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2007.
- Munch, Patricia, 1976. "An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 473-97, June.
- Colwell, Peter F. & Munneke, Henry J., 1997. "The Structure of Urban Land Prices," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
- Brueckner, Jan K., 1997. "Infrastructure financing and urban development:: The economics of impact fees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 383-407, December.
- Geoffrey Turnbull, 2005. "The Investment Incentive Effects of Land Use Regulations," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 357-395, December.
- Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, 1997. "Limited Developers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 329-48, May.
- Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
- Thorsnes, Paul & McMillen, Daniel P, 1998. "Land Value and Parcel Size: A Semiparametric Analysis," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 233-44, November.
- Thomas J. Nechyba & Randall P. Walsh, 2004. "Urban Sprawl," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 177-200, Fall.
- Menezes, Flavio Marques & Pitchford, Rohan, 2001. "Chasing Patents," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 411, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Strange William C., 1995. "Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 317-332, November.
- McFarlane, Alastair, 1999. "Taxes, Fees, and Urban Development," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 416-436, November.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2009.
"Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities,"
2009-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Miceli, 2011. "Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
- Monique DANTAS (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113) & Frédéric GASCHET (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113) & Guillaume POUYANNE (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113), 2010. "Regulatory zoning and coastal housing prices: a bayesian hedonic approach (In French)," Cahiers du GREThA 2010-12, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
- Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011.
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Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
- Kurtis Swope & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan & Robert Shupp, 2009. "The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl: Experimental Evidence," Departmental Working Papers 24, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- Kurtis Swope & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan & Ryan Wielgus, 2010. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-Assembly Problem:An Experimental Study," Departmental Working Papers 29, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt & Robert Shupp & Kurtis Swope1, 2009.
"An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game,"
Southern Economic Journal,
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- Kurtis Swope & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan & Robert Shupp, 2008. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Departmental Working Papers 21, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- In Park, 2013. "Modeling the externalities and redevelopment of a run-down area," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 893-915, December.
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