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Efficiency Wages, Deferred Payments, and Direct Incentives in Agriculture

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  • Enrico Moretti
  • Jeffrey M. Perloff

Abstract

Empirical evidence from agricultural labor markets is consistent with efficiency-wage theory and inconsistent with several alternative explanations. According to this theory, the higher wage or deferred payment (benefits) that direct-hire growers pay relative to that of farm labor contractors is an efficiency wage. Growers use this extra compensation to lower their monitoring expenses and reduce shirking by workers. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-8276.00060
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its journal American Journal of Agricultural Economics.

Volume (Year): 84 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 1144-1155

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:84:y:2002:i:4:p:1144-1155

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Cited by:
  1. He, Goujun & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2012. "Does Customer Auditing Help Chinese Workers?," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt7bb518tz, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
  2. John G. Sessions & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2009. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 4-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  3. Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2009. "Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  4. Sessions, John G. & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2009. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," Department of Economics Working Papers 17071, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  5. Papps, Kerry L., 2010. "Productivity under Large Pay Increases: Evidence from Professional Baseball," IZA Discussion Papers 5133, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. David A. Hennessy, 2005. "Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp418, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  7. repec:eid:wpaper:27/09 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Iwai, Nobuyuki & Emerson, Robert D. & Walters, Lurleen M., 2006. "Legal Status and U.S. Farm Wages," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35335, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.

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