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On Risky Behavior In Bimatrix Games

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  • Gazda Vladimír

    ()

  • Barinková Karolína

    ()

  • Gróf Marek

    ()

  • Kubák Matús

    ()

Abstract

The experiment engaging 50 participants was performed to model and identify the determinants of the players’ risky behavior. Here, a questionnaire and a bimatrix game containing the negative/zero payoffs were used to identify the players’ motives to play risky strategies. Besides the concrete form of the payoffs, the individual risk attitudes were also proved to be statistically significant for risky behavior of the players.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics in its journal The Journal of the Faculty of Economics - Economic.

Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 165-169

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Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:165-169

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Related research

Keywords: Bimatrix Game; Experiment; Risk; Dominant Equilibrium; Maximin; Laplace Insufficient Reason Criterion.;

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  1. Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2003. "Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-101/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
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