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Effective monetary policy committee deliberation in New Zealand

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Abstract

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand targets price stability and supports maximum sustainable employment using monetary policy. In late 2018, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act was amended to make a committee of decision makers responsible for monetary policy decisions, replacing the previous single decision-maker approach. A key goal of a monetary policy committee (MPC) is to make unbiased, and evidence-based monetary policy strategy decision which requires good committee design, high quality inputs and effective monetary policy deliberations. This article introduces a set of guiding principles and formal processes that support strategic decisions by facilitating an environment of robust deliberations. Our principles are: 1. clear objectives, 2. diversity, and 3. inclusion. Our formal processes for MPC deliberations are based on these principles.

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  • Gael Price & Amber Wadsworth, 2019. "Effective monetary policy committee deliberation in New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 82, pages 1-18, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:nzb:nzbbul:apr2019:1
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    File URL: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Bulletins/2019/rbb2019-82-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Brei & Blaise Gadanecz, 2021. "Inter-agency coordination bodies and the speed of prudential policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic," BIS Working Papers 969, Bank for International Settlements.

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