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Rogun - Hydropower Generating Controversy in Central Asia

Author

Listed:
  • Lea Melnikovová

    (Department of International Business, Metropolitan University Prague, Dubečská 900/10, 100 31 Praha 10-Strašnice, Czech Republic)

  • Bohumil Havrland

    (Department of Sustainable Technologies, Faculty of Tropical AgriSciences, Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, Kamýcká 129, 165 21 Praha 6-Suchdol, Czech Republic)

  • Radim Valenčík

    (Department of Economics and International Affairs, Faculty of Economic Studies, The University of Finance and Administration, Estonská 500, 101 00 Praha 10, Czech Republic)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse the current conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over shared water resources, and propose an adequate solution. The tensions between the two countries are associated with the completion of a huge dam on a river on the Tajik territory. Such construction may have a negative impact on Uzbekistan's irrigation needs since it may restrict inflow to the Amudarya River which is Uzbekistan's key water resource. While Tajikistan intends to use water for hydropower, Uzbekistan needs water mainly for its cotton fields. This paper analyses the background, benefits and risks of the dam, roots of the tension, and suggests methods of resolving them. Based on the current dispute, the problem of shared water resources is generalized, discussed and two complementary approaches are presented. The international water law offers a set of guidelines applicable on transboundary water conflicts; the significance of the 1997 UN Convention concerning the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses is emphasized. Another instrument to grasp this problem is the game theory. The water allocation problem can be described using the Nash bargaining solution. This paper demonstrates that both approaches can contribute to resolving existing disputes over shared water resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Lea Melnikovová & Bohumil Havrland & Radim Valenčík, 2014. "Rogun - Hydropower Generating Controversy in Central Asia," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 62(6), pages 1353-1361.
    • Handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2014062061353
    DOI: 10.11118/actaun201462061353
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    2. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    3. World Bank, 2010. "Methodology for Ranking Irrigation Infrastructure Investment Projects," World Bank Publications - Reports 13014, The World Bank Group.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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