This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Tobacco Tax Structure and Smuggling

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sophia Delipalla
Abstract

In a noncompetitive environment, a tax increase leads to a higher fraction of sales smuggled under pure ad valorem taxation, but the effect is ambiguous under a purely specific tax. Under a mixed tax regime, a tax rise increases the fraction of sales smuggled when the balance of the two types of taxes leans towards the ad valorem component. In any case, shifting the balance towards the predominant tax component reduces smuggling. The results are of direct relevance to global tobacco control policies and, in particular, to the smoking intervention and tax harmonization policies in the European Union.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/fa/2009/00000065/00000001/art00006
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

Volume (Year): 65 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 93-104
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200903)65:1_93:ttsas_2.0.tx_2-2

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/fa

Order Information:
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Wolpert).

Related research
Keywords: smuggling; specific taxes; ad valorem taxes; tobacco control; European tax policy;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.