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Low Statutory Power of the Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran

Author

Listed:
  • Khoshnoud , Zahra

    (Monetary and Banking Research Institute (MBRI), Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran)

  • Bultez , Pierre A.

Abstract

Once the responsibilities of central bank increases, developing good governance for achieving its different aims to satisfy the required statutory power becomes more complicated. In the case of the central bank of Islamic republic of Iran - as monetary policymaker and supervisor-this issue is valid as well. Considering the necessity of independency, accountability, and transparency for developing good governance to achieve required statutory power, current laws on the central bank and banking, and the bills on these laws have been evaluated. Since these bills have not been developed based on the importance of the main pillars of central bank governance regarding its core functions and the current laws do not support these pillars as well, we cannot expect that the central bank attains required statutory power. Hence, these bills should be modified to consider these pillars and enhance the level of central bank's governance and its statutory power.

Suggested Citation

  • Khoshnoud , Zahra & Bultez , Pierre A., 2014. "Low Statutory Power of the Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 9(2), pages 23-61, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:mbr:jmonec:v:9:y:2014:i:2:p:23-61
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
    2. Ms. JoAnne Morris & Mr. Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 2004/226, International Monetary Fund.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Bank governance; Independence; Accountability; Transparency; Statutory Power; Monetary policymaking; Regulation; Supervision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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