A Survey of Institutional Frameworks for Financial Stability
AbstractThe aim of this study is to get a better understanding of which financial stability responsibilities have been delegated to central banks (CBs), how these responsibilities are executed, and whether accountability arrangements are in place. For this purpose, a questionnaire was sent to all CBs in the OECD area. We find that there is no unambiguous definition of financial stability or systemic risk, and that, generally, the responsibility for financial stability is not explicitly formulated in laws. However, there seems to be a gradual trend towards clarifying the powers and functions of the CB. Moreover, there is considerable heterogeneity in the way CBs pursue the financial stability objective. Our results suggest that the accountability of the financial stability function of central banks is often poorly arranged.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Occasional Studies with number 104.
Date of creation: Nov 2003
Date of revision:
financial stability; accountability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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