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Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach

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  • John Mbaku
  • Chris Paul

Abstract

The foregoing analysis developed the paradigm of self-interest motivated revolutionary activities. In effect, the construct presented differs from the by-product theory developed by Tullock only in its specific modeling of government-created rents as the engine which drives the violent political behavior. The empirical test of the positive relationship between rent creation by the government and the amount of destabilizing political activity yields strong support for the structuring of politically destabilizing activities as rent-seeking in nature. It is the authors' hope that further empirical investigation and a more general and rigorous modeling of revolution as a rent-seeking activity will become an important part of the literature in public choice. Finally, some policy implications should be discussed. The policy emphasis for the governments of Africa countries should be on opening the economy to competition. Instituting programs to make the economic system more accessible to all segments of society would result in reduced opportunities for rent-seeking. Reducing rent-seeking should result in increased political stability. A reduction in government market intervention would also reduce the costs of government regulations on individual entrepreneurs inducing them to increase their participation in economically productive activities. Taken together the result would be increased political stability and higher rates of economic growth. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • John Mbaku & Chris Paul, 1989. "Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 63-72, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:63:y:1989:i:1:p:63-72
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00223272
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. Sharif Mohammad & John Whalley, 1984. "Rent Seeking in India: Its Costs and Policy Significance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 387-413, August.
    3. Friedman, Milton, 1977. "Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 451-472, June.
    4. Tullock, Gordon, 1971. "The Cost of Transfers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 629-643.
    5. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    6. Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme & Norman Wood, 1985. "The by-product theory of revolution: Some empirical evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 265-274, January.
    7. Morris Silver, 1974. "Political revolution and repression: An economic approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 63-71, March.
    8. Thomas Ireland, 1967. "The rationale of revolt," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 49-66, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kimenyi, Mwangi S. & Mbaku, John Mukum, 1996. "Rents, military elites, and political democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 699-708, April.
    2. Adefeso, Hammed, 2018. "Corruption, Political Instability and Development Nexus in Africa: A Call for Sequential Policies Reforms," MPRA Paper 85277, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. John Mbaku, 1992. "The silent revolution in Africa: Debt, development and democracy," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 127-133, March.
    4. George Klay Kieh Jr, 2009. "The State and Political Instability in Africa," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, January.
    5. Zeeshan, Muhammad & han, Jiabin & Rehman, Alam & Ullah, Irfan & Hussain, Arif & Alam Afridi, Fakhr E., 2022. "Exploring symmetric and asymmetric nexus between corruption, political instability, natural resources and economic growth in the context of Pakistan," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    6. Adams, Richard H. Jr., 2000. "The politics of economic policy reform in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2443, The World Bank.
    7. Kevin Williams, 2017. "Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Growth, and Political Instability," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 17-37, June.

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