IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v182y2020i1d10.1007_s11127-019-00674-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rent seeking as an evolving process: the case of the Ancien Régime

Author

Listed:
  • Robert B. Ekelund

    (Auburn University)

  • Mark Thornton

    (Auburn University
    Ludwig von Mises Institute)

Abstract

Rent-seeking behavior can thrive in democratic and other forms of government where the government is able to hand out exclusive privileges or positions. One of the most famous examples is the venal aristocratic Ancien Régime of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. This paper presents the Revolution as guided by private interests rather than as an uprising powered by aspirations of peasants for the provision of public goods. While taxation, income distribution, and multiple other causal factors played a role, opposition to rent seeking, from merchants, tradespeople, upper-income members of the Third Estate, and others negatively affected by French policies, was the tipping point leading to the Revolution in 1789. In constructing a public choice–based theory to make this argument, we bifurcate the mercantilism that characterized the French economy into seventeenth- and eighteenth-century types.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert B. Ekelund & Mark Thornton, 2020. "Rent seeking as an evolving process: the case of the Ancien Régime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 139-155, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00674-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00674-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-019-00674-8
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-019-00674-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Beuve & Eric Brousseau & Jérôme Sgard, 2017. "Mercantilism and bureaucratic modernization in early eighteenth-century France," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 70(2), pages 529-558, May.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    3. Beuve, Jean & Brousseau, Eric & Sgard, Jérôme, 2017. "Why Are Modern Bureaucracies Special? State Support to Private Firms in Early Eighteenth-Century France," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 1144-1176, December.
    4. Morrisson, Christian & Snyder, Wayne, 2000. "The income inequality of France in historical perspective," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 59-83, April.
    5. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    6. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    7. Milanovic, Branko, 2015. "The Level And Distribution Of Income In Mid-Eighteenth-Century France, According To Franã‡Ois Quesnay," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 17-37, March.
    8. Hayek, F. A., 2012. "The Trend of Economic Thinking," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226321363 edited by Bartley, III, W. W. & Kresge, Stephen, September.
    9. Thornton, Mark, 2007. "Was Richard Cantillon a Mercantilist?," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 417-435, December.
    10. Mark Thornton, 2007. "Cantillon, Hume, and the Rise of Antimercantilism," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 453-480, Fall.
    11. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, January.
    12. Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme & Norman Wood, 1985. "The by-product theory of revolution: Some empirical evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 265-274, January.
    13. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226320670 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1986. "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 471-487, June.
    15. Cantillon, Richard, 1755. "Essai Sur La Nature du Commerce en Général," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number cantillon1755.
    16. Morris Silver, 1974. "Political revolution and repression: An economic approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 63-71, March.
    17. Ekelund, Robert B, Jr & Tollison, Robert D, 1980. "Economic Regulation in Mercantile England: Heckscher Revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(4), pages 567-599, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jaaidane, Touria & Musy, Olivier & Tallec, Ronan, 2022. "Rent-seeking, Reform and Conflict: French Parliaments at the End of the Ancien Régime," MPRA Paper 112067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Andrew Smith & Graham Brownlow, 2023. "Informal Institutions as Inhibitors of Rent-Seeking Entrepreneurship: Evidence From U.S. Legal History," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 47(6), pages 2323-2346, November.
    3. Sutirtha Bagchi & Matthew J. Fagerstrom, 2023. "Wealth inequality and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 89-136, October.
    4. Louis Rouanet, 2021. "The interest group origins of the Bank of France," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 119-140, January.
    5. Touria Jaaidane & Olivier Musy & Ronan Tallec, 2023. "Rent-seeking, reform, and conflict: French parliaments at the end of the Old Regime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 249-275, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    2. Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2016. "A Theory of Why the Ruthless Revolt," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 295-316, November.
    3. Adlai Newson & Francesco Trebbi, 2018. "Authoritarian elites," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 1088-1117, November.
    4. De Magalhaes, Leandro & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2022. "War and the rise of parliaments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    5. John Mbaku & Chris Paul, 1989. "Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 63-72, October.
    6. Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme & Norman Wood, 1985. "The by-product theory of revolution: Some empirical evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 265-274, January.
    7. Marianna Belloc & Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati, 2016. "Earthquakes, Religion, and Transition to Self-Government in ItalianCities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(4), pages 1875-1926.
    8. Rougier, Eric, 2016. "“Fire in Cairo”: Authoritarian–Redistributive Social Contracts, Structural Change, and the Arab Spring," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 148-171.
    9. Snigdha Dewal & Jack A. Goldstone & Michael Volpe, 2013. "Forecasting Stability or Retreat in Emerging Democratic Regimes," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 1(1), pages 32-47.
    10. Omar Al-Ubaydli, 2011. "How Large Looms the Ghost of the Past? State Dependence versus Heterogeneity in Coordination Games," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 273-286, October.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2015. "The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    12. Annamária Artner, 2018. "Can Capitalism Be Truly Democratic?," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 50(4), pages 793-809, December.
    13. Bluhm, Richard & Thomsson, Kaj, 2020. "Holding on? Ethnic divisions, political institutions and the duration of economic declines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    14. Dahlum, Sirianne & Knutsen, Carl Henrik, 2017. "Do Democracies Provide Better Education? Revisiting the Democracy–Human Capital Link," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 186-199.
    15. Alessandro Moro, 2016. "Understanding the Dynamics of Violent Political Revolutions in an Agent-Based Framework," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(4), pages 1-17, April.
    16. Álvaro La Parra‐Pérez, 2020. "For a fistful of pesetas? The political economy of the army in a nonconsolidated democracy: the Second Spanish Republic and Civil War (1931–9)," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 73(2), pages 565-594, May.
    17. Shadmehr, Mehdi & Bernhardt, Dan, 2011. "Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-851, November.
    18. Apolte, Thomas, 2015. "Gordon Tullock's theory of dictatorship and revolution," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2015, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    19. Braunfels, Elias, 2016. "Further Unbundling Institutions," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 13/2016, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    20. Thomas Apolte, "undated". "Why is there no Revolution in North-Korea? The Political Economy of Revolution Revisited," Working Papers 200102, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent-seeking; French mercantilism; Public choice; Revolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N - Economic History
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00674-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.