Susceptibility to coalitional strategic sponsoring
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 144 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Parliamentary agendas; Sponsoring; Strategic behavior; Impartial anonymous culture; D71;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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