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Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order

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Author Info
Peter Leeson ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-007-9246-x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 135 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 67-78
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:135:y:2008:i:1:p:67-78

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Related research
Keywords: Anarchy; Spontaneous order; Gordon Tullock;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Tullock, Gordon, 1999. "Non-prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 455-458, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Leeson, Peter T., 2005. "Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 241-244, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Peter Leeson & Christopher Coyne & Peter Boettke, 2006. "Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 137-147, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Trading with Bandits," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 303-321. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
  6. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 161-188, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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