Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?
AbstractThis paper develops and tests the theory that fiscal rules limit politicians' ability to manipulate the budget for electoral gain. Using panel data from the American states, I find evidence suggesting that stringent balanced budget rules dampen the political business cycle. That is, while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year, this pattern does not exist in states with strict “no-carry” rules. Neither binding gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political business cycle. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 128 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- A Better Balanced Budget Amendment
by Matt Mitchell in Neighborhood Effects on 2011-08-05 21:27:41
- Balanced Budget Rules and Unintended Consequences
by Matt Mitchell in Neighborhood Effects on 2011-07-21 14:22:27
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