In this Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, production of a pollutive good damages production of another good within the same country. Unilateral and bilateral shifts from laissez faire to Pigouvian policy are numerically simulated for cases of low emissions and a high volume of trade, high emissions and a high volume of trade, and finally, high emissions and a low volume of trade. A country can be worse off when it becomes Pigouvian and it can be worse off when its trading partner becomes Pigouvian. Nevertheless, a simple game theory version of the model suggests a “race to the topâ€, in which all countries become Pigouvian. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
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