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Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal number of firms

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  • Jingang Zhao

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  • Jingang Zhao, 2009. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal number of firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(3), pages 235-246, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:98:y:2009:i:3:p:235-246
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-009-0096-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2009. "Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(2), pages 97-118, November.
    2. Kotaro Suzumura & Kazuharu Kiyono, 1987. "Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(1), pages 157-167.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    4. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
    5. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    6. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    7. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Baomin Dong & Frank Wang, 2014. "A pre-emption model of mergers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(2), pages 187-204, October.
    2. Arijit Mukherjee, 2012. "Endogenous cost asymmetry and insufficient entry in the absence of scale economies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 75-82, May.
    3. Borchert, Ingo & Gootiiz, Batshur & Grover, Arti & Mattoo, Aaditya, 2012. "Landlocked or policy locked ? how services trade protection deepens economic isolation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5942, The World Bank.
    4. Angela C. Chao & Jen-yao Lee & Leonard F.S. Wang, 2017. "Stackelberg Competition, Innovation and Social Efficiency of Entry," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(1), pages 1-12, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Entry; Exit; Mergers; Oligopoly; Optimal number of firms; C62; D43; L13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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