Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.
Volume (Year): 16 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
Adverse selection; Optimal taxation; Social insurance; D82; H21; H51;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
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- Robin Boadway & Manuel Leite-Monteiro & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 279-298, 07.
- BOADWAY, Robin & LEITE-MONTEIRO, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2004. "Social insurance and redistribution with moral hazard and adverse selection," CORE Discussion Papers 2004083, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
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