Does certificate of need affect cardiac outcomes and costs?
AbstractSeveral U.S. states enforce Certificate of Need (CON) regulations, which limit the number of hospitals performing open heart surgery or coronary angioplasty. CON regulations were intended to restrain cost growth and improve quality of care. This study compares mortality rates and costs for cardiac care in states with and without CON. CON appears to raise hospital procedure volume and lower the average cost of care. However, CON is associated with little reduction in inpatient mortality, and it may lead hospitals to operate on more patients than they would otherwise. The claimed welfare benefits of CON regulations require careful reconsideration. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics.
Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=106603
Regulation; Certificate of need; Outcomes assessment; Cardiac surgery; Costs; I110 Analysis of Health Care Markets; I180 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- Ana - General Economics and Teaching - - - - -
- of - - -
- Hea - Public Economics - - - - -
- Car - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- Mar - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - - - -
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- Hea - Public Economics - - - - -
- Gov - Financial Economics - - - - -
- Pol - Economic Systems - - - - -
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David M. Cutler & Robert S. Huckman, 2002.
"Technological Development and Medical Productivity: The Diffusion of Angioplasty in New York State,"
NBER Working Papers
9311, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cutler, David M. & Huckman, Robert S., 2003. "Technological development and medical productivity: the diffusion of angioplasty in New York state," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 187-217, March.
- Noether, Monica, 1988. "Competition among hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 259-284, September.
- Lanning, Joyce A & Morrisey, Michael A & Ohsfeldt, Robert L, 1991. "Endogenous Hospital Regulation and Its Effects on Hospital and Non-hospital Expenditures," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-54, June.
- David Meltzer & Jeanette Chung & Anirban Basu, 2002. "Does Competition under Medicare Prospective Payment Selectively Reduce Expenditures on High-Cost Patients?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 447-468, Autumn.
- Cutler, David & Huckman, Robert, 2003. "Technological Development and Medical Productivity: The Diffusion of Angioplasty in New York State," Scholarly Articles 2664291, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, 2000. "Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 577-615, May.
- Ho, Vivian, 2002. "Learning and the evolution of medical technologies: the diffusion of coronary angioplasty," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 873-885, September.
- Polsky, Daniel & David, Guy & Yang, Jianing & Kinosian, Bruce & Werner, Rachel M., 2014. "The effect of entry regulation in the health care sector: The case of home health," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-14.
- David M. Cutler & Robert S. Huckman & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2009.
"Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery,"
Harvard Business School Working Papers
10-011, Harvard Business School.
- David M. Cutler & Robert S. Huckman & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2010. "Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 51-76, February.
- David M. Cutler & Robert S. Huckman & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2009. "Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery," NBER Working Papers 15214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Suhui Li & Avi Dor, 2013. "How Do Hospitals Respond to Market Entry? Evidence from A Deregulated Market for Cardiac Revascularization," NBER Working Papers 18926, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guy David & Lorens A. Helmchen & Robert A. Henderson, 2009. "Does advanced medical technology encourage hospitalist use and their direct employment by hospitals?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 237-247.
- Wang, Justin & Hockenberry, Jason & Chou, Shin-Yi & Yang, Muzhe, 2011.
"Do bad report cards have consequences? Impacts of publicly reported provider quality information on the CABG market in Pennsylvania,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 392-407, March.
- Justin Wang & Jason Hockenberry & Shin-Yi Chou & Muzhe Yang, 2010. "Do Bad Report Cards Have Consequences? Impacts of Publicly Reported Provider Quality Information on the CABG Market in Pennsylvania," NBER Working Papers 16225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cutler, David M. & Huckman, Robert Steven & Kolstad, Jonathan T., 2010. "Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery," Scholarly Articles 5344226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.