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Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France

Author

Listed:
  • Panayotis Constantinou

    (Université Paris-Saclay, Université Paris-Sud, UVSQ)

  • Jonathan Sicsic

    (Université Paris-Saclay, Université Paris-Sud, UVSQ)

  • Carine Franc

    (Université Paris-Saclay, Université Paris-Sud, UVSQ)

Abstract

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been increasingly used across different healthcare settings to incentivize the provision of targeted services. In this study, we investigated the effect of a nationwide P4P scheme for general practitioners implemented in 2012 in France, on cervical cancer screening practices. Using data from a nationally representative permanent sample of health insurance beneficiaries, we analyzed smear test use of eligible women for the years 2006–2014. Our longitudinal sample was an unbalanced panel comprising 180,167 women eligible from 1 to 9 years each. We took into account that during our study period some women were exposed to another incentive for screening participation: the implementation in 2010 of organized screening (OS) in a limited number of areas. To evaluate the effect of P4P, we defined three different measures of smear utilization. For each measure, we specified binary panel-data models to estimate annual probabilities and to compare each estimate to the 2011 baseline level. To explore the combined effect of P4P and OS in areas exposed to both incentives, we computed interaction terms between year dummies and area of residence. We found that P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. This effect is likely to be transient as annual smear use, both for the whole sample and among women overdue for screening, increased only in 2013 and decreased again in 2014. The combined effect of P4P and OS on screening participation was not cumulative during the first years of coexistence.

Suggested Citation

  • Panayotis Constantinou & Jonathan Sicsic & Carine Franc, 2017. "Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 181-201, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ijhcfe:v:17:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10754-016-9207-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10754-016-9207-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Lina Maria Ellegård, 2020. "Effects of pay-for-performance on prescription of hypertension drugs among public and private primary care providers in Sweden," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 215-228, September.
    2. Monica Giancotti & Giorgia Rotundo & Paolo Misericordia & Silvestro Scotti & Milena Lopreite & Marianna Mauro, 2018. "Preliminary investigation into general practitioners? willingness to accept the pay-for-performance scheme: A replication study," MECOSAN, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(106), pages 65-92.
    3. Mauro, Marianna & Rotundo, Giorgia & Giancotti, Monica, 2019. "Effect of financial incentives on breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening delivery rates: Results from a systematic literature review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(12), pages 1210-1220.
    4. Pantelidis, Pantelis & Vozikis, Athanassios & Meggouli, Eirini, 2019. "Strategies to prioritize prevention in the Greek primary healthcare system," MPRA Paper 92103, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pay for performance; Cervical cancer screening; Preventive health services; Primary health care; France;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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