Effective environmental protection in the context of government decentralization
AbstractChina has shifted control over resources and decision making to local governments and enterprises as the result of the economic reforms over the past three decades. This devolution of decision-making to local levels and enterprises has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of local officials and polluting enterprises who are more concerned with economic growth and profits than the environment. Therefore, effective environmental protection needs their full cooperation. Against this background, this paper discusses a variety of tactics that Chinaâs central government has been using to incentivize local governments, and a number of market-based instruments, supporting economic policies, environmental performance ratings and disclosure and cooperation with financial institutions to promote long-lasting, improved corporate energy-saving and environmental performance. It concludes that there is a clear need to carefully examine those objective and subjective factors that lead to the lack of local officialâs cooperation on the environment, and provides some suggestions for appropriated incentives to get their cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Economics and Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 9 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=111059
Effective environmental protection; Incentive structure; Economic instruments; Industrial policy; Financial institutions; Government decentralization; China; Q53; Q56; Q58; Q43; Q48; H23; H75; R51;
Other versions of this item:
- ZhongXiang Zhang, 2011. "Effective Environmental Protection in the Context of Government Decentralization," Working Papers 2011.17, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Q43 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy and the Macroeconomy
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H - Public Economics
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