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Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

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  • Sigrid Suetens
  • Jan Potters

Abstract

On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets. Copyright Economic Science Association 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Sigrid Suetens & Jan Potters, 2007. "Bertrand colludes more than Cournot," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 71-77, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:1:p:71-77
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9132-2
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    1. Potters, Jan & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "Collusion under yardstick competition: an experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1017-1038, September.
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    6. Martin, Stephen, 1996. "R & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 733-741, April.
    7. Davis, Douglas D., 2002. "Strategic interactions, market information and predicting the effects of mergers in differentiated product markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(9), pages 1277-1312, November.
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